In this first paper dealing with Heraclitus ' doctrine as such, the author examines and discusses two recent controversial articles with the content of which he sympathizes - one by Gábor Betegh on the cosmological status of Heraclitus ' psychê, and the other by Aryeh Finkelberg on Heraclitus ' cosmogony and the reality of a Heraclitean world conflagration. This examination is aimed, first, at fostering "marginal" opinions which the author believes to be fundamentally correct - and the rejection of which (...) since times immemorial he considers to have greatly harmed and hampered our understanding of the Ephesian philosopher ; second, at introducing some personal corrections and additions to these opinions ; and third, at illustrating the advantages of a deliberately un prejudiced approach towards our sources, an approach based on the presumption of innocence, knowledgeability and intelligence for all our informers and on the rejection of any rejection [this is not a dittography!] of any source on ground of mere suspicion.Among the proposed novelties the following particularly deserve to be underscored: the defense of the authenticity of "fr. B 76" DK qua three different fragments and the reconstruction of Heraclitus ' system of four physical exhalations - both of which are connected with the notion of a world soul; and the interpretation of Plat. Soph. 242 C - 243 A [T 132] as confirming Arist. De cael. 279b12 [T 170] and the cosmogonical interpretation of F 31 - both of which presuppose the reality of a Heraclitean ecpyrosis.Yet, since the author's dogmatism does not extend beyond the requirement of having re course to logically sound procedures, he is ready to give up any conclusion of which it can be proven that it is irreconcilably contradicted by a sounder one and supported by none. (shrink)

Constitué d'analyses et de réflexions sur les méthodes pratiquées aujourd'hui dans l'écriture de l'histoire de la philosophie, cet ouvrage vise à rendre compte de la différence des pratiques existant selon les traditions et à interroger l'existence d'une démarche historique spécifique au domaine de la philosophie. L'enjeu fondamental est donc de savoir s'il existe une historiographie propre à la philosophie. Les interrogations portent en particulier sur les questions des critères d'exactitude, de vérification, de crédibilité qui permettraient de distinguer et de décider (...) entre les interprétations. Si le travail de l'interprétation est infini, toujours à refaire, reprendre et corriger, cela n'implique nullement l'abandon des exigences qui fondent la pertinence historique. Une introduction indispensable à toute pratique de l'histoire de la philosophie. L'ouvrage comporte notamment des textes de : P. Aubenque (Paris IV), J. Biard (Tours), B. Bourgeois (Paris I), C. Coutel (Artois), Th. De Koninck (Laval, Québec), D. Deleule (Paris X), D. Garber (Chicago), P. Magnard (Paris IV), J.-M. Narbonne (Laval, Québec), E. Nuzzo (Salerne), John Rogers (Keele), J. B. Schneewind (Johns-Hopkins, Baltimore), Tom Sorell (Essex), J.-L. Vieillard-Baron (Poitiers), Y. C. Zarka (CNRS, Paris), mais aussi de F. P. Adorno (Salerne, CNRS), P. Caye (CNRS), P. Destrée (CNRS, Belgique), T. Gontier (CNRS), J.-B. Gourinat (CNRS), E. Picavet (Paris I), I. Radrizzani (Munich), C. Viano (CNRS), A. Vasiliu (CNRS). (shrink)

Structuralism about mathematical objects and structuralist accounts of physical computation both face indeterminacy objections. For the former, the problem arises for cases such as the complex roots i and \, for which a automorphism can be defined, thus establishing the structural identity of these importantly distinct mathematical objects. In the case of the latter, the problem arises for logical duals such as AND and OR, which have invertible structural profiles :369–400, 2001). This makes their physical implementations indeterminate, in the sense (...) that their structural profiles alone cannot establish whether a given physical component is an AND-gate or an OR-gate. Doherty has recently shown both problems to be analogous, and has argued that computational structuralism is threatened with the absurd conclusion that computational digits might be indiscernible, such that, if structural properties are all that we have to go on, the binary digit 0 must be treated as identical to the binary digit 1. However, we think that a solution to the indiscernibility problem for mathematical structuralists, drawing on the work of David Hilbert, can be adapted for the analogous problem in the computational case, thereby rescuing the structuralist approach to physical computation. (shrink)

Although Marx dubbed landowners one of the ‘three great classes’ of modern society, the most prominent Marxian and socialist thinkers of capitalism and land over the past century – from Lefebvre to Massey to Harvey – have implicitly or explicitly argued that landowners are not capitalism’s ‘third class’, and that the social relations of land are marginal or contingent to the mode of production as a whole. Through assessing the work of Marxist geographers, political economists, value-form theorists, and others who (...) have dismissed the class-status of landowners and blurred the line between ground rent and interest, this article argues that the theory of the landowning class is fundamental to the understanding of the totality of capitalist social relations, as well as to developing more incisive analyses of struggles around housing, land, and movement today. (shrink)

We propose a new approach to describe quantum mechanics as a manifestation of non-Euclidean geometry. In particular, we construct a new geometrical space that we shall call Qwist. A Qwist space has a extra scalar degree of freedom that ultimately will be identified with quantum effects. The geometrical properties of Qwist allow us to formulate a geometrical version of the uncertainty principle. This relativistic uncertainty relation unifies the position-momentum and time-energy uncertainty principles in a unique relation that recover both of (...) them in the non-relativistic limit. (shrink)

Taking Locke's epistemology as a starting-point, Maine de Biran elaborated the notions of expectation of resistance and kinaesthetic response into a theory which attempted to account for the origin of our ideas of personal identity and causation. In this clear and intelligent study, Hallie compares Maine de Biran to the British empiricists, finding him most in sympathy with Berkeley; he also assesses the importance and limitations of this internal critique of empiricism for both empiricism and later French philosophy.--R. F. T.

The "perspectivism" of the late Dr. McGilvary's 1939 Carus Lectures has two moments. On the one hand it is an examination of the implications of physical relativity for epistemology. In this area McGilvary is at his best--particularly in clearing up misunderstandings of Einstein. But perspectivism is also a revival of the "man the measure" doctrine, and this has less happy results. Viewing the philosopher's task as the making clear of his own postulates, McGilvary is led to beg many of the (...) questions one would like to see him discuss. If a philosophy is put forward postulationally and is to be more than an abstract schema, it must be formulated positively and it must be applied at every opportunity. Perspectivism does not meet either test very well.--R. F. T. (shrink)

Claudel's last work, J'aime la Bible is an appreciation of great feeling at its best and a kind of muddy carping with the Bible's detractors at its worst. The translation, by Wade Balkin, is idiomatic rather than poetic, and reads smoothly and easily.--R. F. T.

A short study of the techniques of geochronology.--R. F. T.

One of Mr. Popper's earliest jousts with the historicists. In it, Popper says, "I have not hesitated to construct arguments in [historicism's] support which have not, to my knowledge, been brought forward by historicists themselves. I hope, that in this way, I have succeeded in building up a position worth attacking". It is difficult to see, however, that this sort of supplementation adds anything to the earlier books: The Open Society and Its Enemies was a dialogue ; The Poverty of (...) Historicism is a monologue.--R. F. T. (shrink)